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Abstract
Many dependability techniques expect certain behaviors
from the underlying subsystems and fail in chaotic ways if
these expectations are not met. Under expected circum-
stances, however, software tends to work quite well. This
paper suggests that, instead of fixing elusive bugs or rewrit-
ing software, we improve the predictability of conditions
faced by our programs. This approach might be a cheaper
and faster way to improve dependability of software. After
identifying some of the common triggers of unpredictabil-
ity, the paper describes three engineering principles that
hold promise in combating unpredictability, suggests a way
to benchmark predictability, and outlines a brief research
agenda.
1 Introduction
Dependability has traditionally been defined as the con-
fluence of reliability, availability, security, and safety [14];
a system is not dependable when any of these properties is
lacking. Most unplanned violations of dependability proper-
ties trace their roots to some subsystem’s unpredictable be-
havior in the face of unpredicted stressors. If the designer or
administrator of a system could accurately reason about the
system’s reaction to both known and unknown stimuli, then
she could assess a priori whether that system will satisfy its
users’ dependability requirements. Predictable behavior fa-
cilitates accurate provisioning and enables failure manage-
ment infrastructures that avert system-wide failure.
Much deployed software, however, is not predictable.
When given their expected ranges of input and resource
availability, programs generally output results that conform
to their users’ expectations. Unexpected conditions, how-
ever, can lead to cascading failures: an initial fault perturbs
one module’s input, which make its output and resource con-
sumption erratic; this deprives nearby modules of resources
and provides wrong inputs to other modules, which fail and
increase the amplitude of the propagating failure wave. The
ensuing chaos blurs the cause of failure, making diagnosis
progressively more difficult. A dependable system should
never behave unpredictably in the face of failure; it is OK to
fail, but should do so in well-understood, controlled ways.
Based on the assumption that software works well when
not pushed to unexplored boundaries, this paper posits that
system predictability can be improved by providing pro-
grams with the environment they expect, along with damp-
ening circuits to control propagation of failure. Compared
to developing new technology for tolerating failures, im-
proving predictability may provide a cheaper, faster way to
achieve the level of dependability we seek, because it allows
existing techniques to be leveraged effectively.
2 Unpredictable Behavior
To control unpredictability, we need to first understand
the sources of such unpredictability—they can be inter-
nal (e.g., deterministic bugs), or external. The proposed
approach focuses on external triggers of unpredictability,
so here I survey three categories of such triggers: unex-
pected inputs, undue resource utilization, and unusual failure
modes.
Unexpected Inputs
Inputs to a system can be unexpected in at least three ways:
in terms of size, content, and the rate at which input arrives.
Unexpected size: The vast majority of CERT’s 142 alerts
regarding security and availability compromises since year
2000 are due to buffer overflows, in which input longer
than expected overwrites the program’s stack with attacker-
provided code. One of the most visible cases was SQL Slam-
mer [3], a stack-overwriting worm that attacked Microsoft
SQL Server’s resolution service, gaining control of the ma-
chine and then self-replicating to other hosts. Set against
SQL Slammer’s estimated impact of more than $1 billion,
specifying and enforcing the maximum size of each type of
network packet SQL Server accepts seems trivial.
Unexpected content: A recent exploit in Mailman, the
GNU mailing list manager, allowed attackers to crash it by
using a specially crafted e-mail message that exploited a
bug in the message parsing component [17]. Similar denial-
of-service vulnerabilities, this time related to HTML pars-
ing, have plagued the Apache web server and the Squid
proxy cache [3]. Recently, the most widely used DNS server
(BIND) had a bug that allowed a remote attacker to poison its
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name resolution cache [17]. In all of these cases, separately
verifying the validity of the inputs before delivering them to
the vulnerable programs was straightforward, but required
thought and, perhaps, a slight loss in performance.
Unexpected rate of arrival: Internet services often
fail due to overload conditions. A notorious example is
CNN.com, the online news provider: On the morning of
September 11, 2001, accesses to its front page increased
from 1,400 requests/sec to 3,800 requests/sec within 15 min-
utes [15]. In spite of CNN.com’s load balancers, dynamic
server provisioning systems, and procedures for reducing
HTML complexity for front-page news in response to high
demand, the site collapsed. Administrators were unable to
access the machines remotely because of thrashing and the
number of network sessions having reached the maximum
supported number. After a few hours, the site came back
up; on that day, CNN.com’s estimated peak load exceeded
30,000 requests/sec. The system would have been able to
handle this peak load, but was not able to adapt fast enough
when workload was doubling every 5 minutes; suitable ad-
mission control would have allowed CNN.com to stay within
operating range. Although large Internet services have sev-
eral mechanisms in place to control the magnitude of request
load, few (if any) check for how the rate of arrival evolves.
The inputs described in this section originated at sources
that were outside the receiver’s administrative realm (e.g.,
end users, remote systems). The next section addresses an-
other category of input: the output of software modules that
the receiver directly interacts with, within the same realm of
control.
Unaudited Output
In order to manage behavior of large programs, software en-
gineers developed the concept of modules with well-defined
interfaces, which isolate code within a known set of behavior
boundaries. Over time, however, module behavior changes
in subtle ways as internal code gets modified and optimized.
Even if behavior did not change, programmers use mod-
ules in ways that the modules’ original designers had not
envisioned, exercising poorly tested paths that lead to unex-
pected behavior. Programmer churn compounds these dy-
namics, because new programmers modify and/or use code
they do not understand. In a study of a high-end IBM oper-
ating system [22], code reuse has been given as one expla-
nation for the high incidence (56%) of boundary condition
bugs that had a high impact on the system’s user population.
Misbehaving modules’ outputs become other modules’
inputs and can lead to unexpected effects outside the sys-
tem. A recent survey of email administrators [11] found that
botched upgrades and misconfiguration caused 42% of all
lost email incidents. Similarly, downtime in the US pub-
lic telephone network increased from 15 million customer-
minutes per month in 1992-1994 [12] to 155 million per
month in 2000 [7] — one explanation is the widespread Y2K
patches. If outputs could be kept conformant independently
of patches, misconfiguration, and misuse, then software evo-
lution would pose less of a risk.
Reckless Resource Usage
Software aging is the process by which the state of long-
running programs degrades over time through exhaustion of
system resources, data corruption, or numerical error accu-
mulation. Aging may lead to a potpourri of unexpected be-
havior: performance degradation, crashes, hangs, etc. Ex-
hausted resources can range from memory and disk space to
CPU time and operating system structures like file descrip-
tors. Software aging is particularly problematic for popu-
lar Internet services, because their resource consumption is
workload-driven and they face large workloads on a regu-
lar basis; scientific applications suffer as well, because they
run for a long time. A recent version of Apache leaks 80
bytes of memory every time an HTTP request has a line-
feed on a line by itself (which is legal input); bombarded
with large chunks of linefeeds, Apache runs out of memory
and crashes within seconds [17]. Software tends to become
increasingly less predictable when faced with a shortage of
resources, both because it may not check for such condi-
tions and because code paths that are normally not exercised
now get executed. In the Apache example, on Linux ker-
nel 2.4.20, once the leaking process’ footprint exceeds the
amount of swap space, a kernel bug in the swap code freezes
the entire machine in about 50% of the cases.
Many server applications preallocate memory pools and
do their own memory management. This suggests that, if
there is a chance memory may be insufficient, they insist on
knowing ahead of time—predictable resource availability is
sometimes more important than resource availability itself.
Historically, simplicity has been the key to dependabil-
ity, because simplicity begets predictability; simple systems
tend to work, while complex ones don’t. The challenge is
to build complex systems that are dependable; one way to
do so is by preserving the simplicity of the interactions be-
tween their components. Having motivated the need for pre-
dictability, I will now argue for putting order in the seem-
ingly anarchic universe of software.
3 The Physics of Software
Mature engineering disciplines are constrained and, at
the same time, blessed with the immutable laws of physics.
They take the form of macroscopic, descriptive laws that
capture physical invariants (e.g., Joule’s heat dissipation law
for electric circuits P = RI2). These are safe-to-make as-
sumptions that engineers use to reason about the future be-
havior of an electric circuit, a steel structure, or a chemical
process; no effort is required to preserve such invariants.
This paper argues that we restrict the inputs, outputs, and
internal states of software, the same way laws of physics
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constrain physical systems. Unlike the physical world, how-
ever, in software we need to formulate and enforce such in-
variants ourselves. The rest of this section describes three
ways to define such invariants; although described with re-
spect to individual modules, the three methods apply hier-
archically at all levels of granularity within a system, from
small components to large subsystems.
Fail Early
It is acceptable for a program to fail when given inputs that
the designer had assumed impossible, but it is not acceptable
for such inputs to be allowed. Electric circuits, for instance,
malfunction if exposed to current exceeding their design
point; their inputs, however, are controlled by fuses—wires
that physically disintegrate when carrying current above a
certain threshold. The absence of fuses and circuit breakers
would make household electricity and many other applica-
tions impractical, due to the fire danger and other mayhem
resulting from overloaded circuits. Laws of physics cannot
prevent all power spikes and miswiring, but they can guar-
antee that excessive current will not flow through a fuse.
A software fuse is a filter that drops any input that does
not meet the receiving program’s expectations. The input in-
variants encoded in fuses need to be explicit about at least
the bounds on the length of acceptable input, content (e.g.,
only accept ASCII characters), and nature of workload—in
effect stating acceptability properties [20] for inputs. State-
ful packet-inspecting firewalls are fuses: they enforce fairly
sophisticated invariants on the kind of network traffic that
passes through, such as blocking non-HTTP communication
tunneled over the HTTP permitted by corporate firewalls. In-
put invariants do not have to be static: dynamic feedback
loops between the system and its input fuses can parameter-
ize adaptive invariants. Analogously to band-pass filters in
analog circuits, input invariants should limit the rate at which
workload varies, to prevent the kind of failure CNN.com ex-
perienced on Sep. 11, 2001. Input fuses can span inputs of
multiple modules, to enforce higher granularity properties.
Given the frequency with which systems fail due to bad in-
puts or overload, one can only conclude that programmers
are pathological optimists.
Kill the Gluttons
A large fraction of downtime results from undue resource
utilization, which deprives other modules of the resources
they need; such resources consist of bits (memory, disk,
network bandwidth, etc.) and time (CPU time, transaction
commit time, etc.). Running out of resources is a normal
occurrence and dependable applications must handle it. The
fact that memory leaks are still rampant in garbage-collected
J2EE applications shows that language constructs are not
sufficient for taming resource unpredictability—instead, a
congruency between the resource model and underlying re-
ality is required. Exporting accurate resource models to ap-
plication programmers without requiring them to perform
explicit management (e.g., via malloc and free) is chal-
lenging, but necessary for predictability. Flexible resource
models, such as leases [9] and market-based node manage-
ment [4], can help, if their paradigm is assimilated in the
programming languages or framework.
Once the constraints of the resource model are properly
exposed in the form of known invariants, any violation can
legitimately be considered evidence of a bug. Resource cops
in the underlying execution framework can then promptly
suspend or terminate the offender. The simplest form of re-
source control allows a system to execute until it runs out
of some resource, or its utilization exceeds a threshold, and
then reboots it. In multi-tiered systems, resource utiliza-
tion can be tied to requests and each incoming request be
given a time-to-live; should the time-to-live reach zero dur-
ing processing, the request gets squashed and all associated
resources are freed, thus coercing resource gluttony into a
clean request failure. A watchdog is a good example of a re-
source cop: in PHP, a server-side scripting language, timers
will terminate a script when it exceeds its allotted time, thus
freeing the CPU and preventing further resource hogging.
Fail in Known Ways
When a system fails, either it provides strange results
(Byzantine behavior), or becomes disabled and provides no
answers until it is recovered (fail-stop behavior). A depend-
able system never exhibits Byzantine behavior and only fails
into one of a small set of states, thus making recovery easier
and halting further propagation.
Verifying that the output of a program has a desired prop-
erty is often easier than producing output with that property
(e.g., prime factorization of an integer). Programs can there-
fore have simple, orthogonal output guards that capture the
invariants required of correct output, to as fine a granular-
ity as is practical. Since verifying properties of a data set
often requires different algorithms than producing the data
set (e.g., sorting a list), output guards can legitimately in-
crease confidence in the correctness of output, unlike N-
version programming. For example, the U.S. National Se-
curity Agency locks up uncertified operating systems and
applications inside virtual machines and monitors their net-
work communication to ensure that the application inside
does not violate desired security invariants [21]. When an
output guard detects a violation, it can suspend or stop the
module, thus coercing Byzantine into fail-stop behavior.
Output guards can enforce larger granularity constraints
by spanning the output of multiple modules. Should en-
forcement of desired invariants become too expensive, out-
put guards can sample the output, rather than check every
single response. Sophisticated guards can enforce output in-
variants by correlating outputs to the inputs that generated
them, as suggested in [20].
Impending failure can sometimes be inferred by moni-
toring system aspects that are not related to output. For in-
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stance, the earlier PHP watchdog timer example shows how
hang failures can be coerced into crash failures. Another
example maps observed low-level faults onto a set of faults
known to be well tolerated by existing recovery code [18].
Checking data structures with assert()-like macros can
turn runtime violation of data invariants into a suspend or
reboot of the faulty module, thus preempting a wider disas-
ter. In most systems, data structure inconsistencies are often
indicators of much deeper problems, that are easier to deal
with by stopping; limping along might further compromise
system integrity and uselessly consume resources.
4 From Predictability to Dependability
Immediate detection of invariant violations in inputs, out-
puts, and resource usage enables fast fault detection, pre-
venting further system failure. Admission control tuned to
the CNN.com cluster’s ability to scale under load could have
avoided its collapse on Sep. 11. Instead of fixing insidious
bugs, one might simply prevent the bug-triggering inputs
from entering the system. Most of the bug fixes address-
ing the SQL Slammer, Mailman, Apache, Squid, and BIND
exploits (described in Section 2) took the form of more thor-
ough input checking; the same effect could have been ob-
tained out in the field by operators interposing input fuses.
Output guards and input fuses can dampen the domino ef-
fect of a propagating fault through containment. This is par-
ticularly important in large scale enterprise systems, where a
major source of failures results from poor integration of new
code with legacy software. Connection frameworks, such
as JCA (Java Connector Architecture [23]), are a good ve-
hicle for implementing fuses and guards, that turn poorly
understood behavior of legacy components into predictable
behavior. Resource cops can reside inside J2EE applica-
tion servers, which are frequently used for legacy integra-
tion. Engineering away unpredictability with guards, fuses,
and resource cops is often easier than rewriting old software
(which may sometimes not even be an option), and hence
cheaper. Enforced predictability could also encourage more
frequent reuse of debugged software modules.
Prompt fault detection plus fast recovery is the recipe for
high availability. Well-understood failure states enable the
development of fast and effective recovery procedures; the
success of the transaction model [10] is testimony to how
a simple, well-defined fault model can improve the depend-
ability of applications.
The threat of program termination when outputs or re-
source consumption do not meet expectations should moti-
vate developers to write correct and complete input fuses for
their modules. The mere formulation of input invariants im-
proves a developers’ understanding of the system and helps
find bugs in the module’s logic. Guards and fuses that catch
wrong assumptions also provide immediate feedback and fa-
cilitate debugging during development.
Rigorously developing fuses and guards can improve the
effectiveness of testing, thus increasing software quality. By
excising the task of input and output validation from the
main code into separate fuses and guards, we essentially de-
velop live testing modules. Since they are considerably sim-
pler, their correctness could be verified using formal meth-
ods (in fact, their simplicity automatically makes them less
prone to bugs). Then, the system itself need only be tested
on filtered inputs, which can be considerably fewer than un-
filtered ones, depending on the application.
Predictably faulty behavior can be efficiently compen-
sated for, thus turning expensive unplanned downtime of
buggy software into planned downtime. For instance, a web
server that leaks memory at a constant rate can be rebooted
shortly before its predicted failure point. Unpredictability
calls for overprovisioning to accommodate variations, which
means more resources to be purchased and managed; pre-
dictable systems may allow for lower error margins and re-
quire less human oversight. For example, in the US public
telephone system, 30% of failures are due to hardware, yet
hardware causes only 19% of total downtime [7]. Switch-
ing hardware has simple failure semantics and replacement
procedures, enabling technician crews to recover it quickly.
Predictable behavior can reduce the chances for operator
errors and improve a system’s perceived availability. Var-
ious psychological studies have shown that, when acting
under pressure, humans are poor at analyzing the situation
and making intelligent decisions [19]; most human opera-
tor errors result from such hasty actions. Predictable fail-
ure behavior offers opportunities to accumulate experience
with similar failures through repetition, as well as to de-
velop automated procedures for failure management. Pre-
dictability may also reduce the number of system “knobs,”
which means less risk for error. Additionally, end user per-
ception of the system’s dependability could increase with
predictability; a study of computer users has found that in-
creased predictability of terminal response time gave rise to
more productive and satisfied users than unpredictable ac-
cess, even when response time was as high as 5 seconds [16].
5 Variance as a Predictability Benchmark
Improving predictability may take a toll on some system
properties (e.g., performance), and reward the designer with
improvements in other areas (e.g., recovery time). Choosing
the right combination of predictability, performance, cost,
etc. requires a way to measure changes in predictability.
Sometimes predictability is not important, while in other
cases it may yield high value. For example, in a triple-
modular redundant design, the system mean-time-to-failure
MTTF is reduced, because the system stops when any one of
its 3 modules fails, but mean-time-to-recover MTTR from a
single faulty value is predictably zero.
The definition of “right tradeoff” generally relates to user
expectations or cost. It has been argued that reducing MTTR
improves availability if MTTF stays the same, because avail-
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ability is MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR) [5]. However, a small
MTTR does not guarantee fast recovery, if the TTR dis-
tribution is heavy-tailed. Failures under high load usually
lead to the longest recovery times, thus affecting even more
users, so a lower-variance TTR distribution might actually
be more useful, even if it entails a higher mean. A web-based
service with an end-to-end {MTTR, standard deviation} of
{µ=6 sec, σ=2.5} will have better end-user perceived avail-
ability if it reduces variance to zero, even if that requires rais-
ing MTTR: {µ=8 sec, σ=0}. In the latter case, an observed
outage will never last more than 8 sec (which is known to
be the patience threshold for humans using web-based ser-
vices [2]). The former system (µ=6 sec) allows a significant
fraction of outages to last longer than 8 seconds, or allows a
few outages to take excessive amounts of time.
To benchmark a system’s predictability, we would first
need to establish an invariant and measure how close (heuris-
tically) to that invariant the system’s behavior is. Consider
measuring the predictability of recovery in an Oracle 9i
database system: set the FAST START MTTR TARGET pa-
rameter [13] to t = 1 minute (representing a recovery time
invariant). Then place the standard TPC-C load on the sys-
tem, crash it, and measure recovery time. Repeat several
times and compute the variance. Repeat the same experi-
ment for other values of t. The predictability metric tells us
how tightly clustered the recovery times are around the cho-
sen FAST START MTTR TARGET value. A low variance
can offer confidence that, in production, the DBMS will pro-
vide recovery times within the predicted bounds.
6 Research Agenda
The most common approach to making programs work
as expected consists of finding and fixing bugs in the source
code. External invariant enforcers can treat programs as
black boxes, but they are likely to be less effective against in-
ternal triggers of unpredictability than against external ones.
This research agenda will focus on bringing predictability
to existing software modules that must be treated as black
boxes. The overhead of creating fuses, guards, or cops is best
justified when modification of the software itself is difficult
or impractical, thus making legacy software a prime candi-
date. Systems connected to the open Internet are particularly
interesting due to the unpredictability of their workload.
Smart fuses in C++ and Java: The easiest software fuse
is an if statement or a simple admission control rule; the
more sophisticated invariants, however, require expressive
declarative languages that can capture temporal properties.
Unfortunately, programmers have enough trouble mastering
their main programming language, so mandating additional
languages with substantially different paradigms is imprac-
tical. Two artifacts that can be of real help to practition-
ers would be a set of parameterized fuse prototypes (e.g.,
that enforce tunable temporal properties of workload evolu-
tion) and libraries that allow programmers to write their own
fuses, directly encoding input invariants. Model-checking
and other formal methods can be used to increase confidence
in the correctness of the fuse libraries.
Aids for invariants: Success of fuses, guards, and cops
depends on the correctness and completeness of the invari-
ants they enforce. Not only do common programmers not
have good tools to formulate such invariants, but they don’t
always realize all the assumptions they’re making. Recent
work [8, 6] has made important progress in learning invari-
ants by observing program behavior, but more remains to be
done for these techniques to work with legacy black boxes.
Deduced invariants could be presented to programmers, or
enforced and verified on subsequent executions of the pro-
grams. Such tools could also be used standalone by devel-
opers to better understand the system they are assembling.
Nontrivial output guards: Substantially meaningful out-
put invariants can most likely not be stated independently of
the inputs generating that output. As such, the more sophis-
ticated the output invariant, the more likely it becomes that
the guard duplicates parts of the program itself. The solu-
tion lies in identifying abstract classes of modules that can
share guard constructs (e.g., all Java EJBs support standard
sets of methods that can be guarded by common invariants),
and then using output sampling to statistically enforce the
output invariants. Identifying optimality of when and how to
sample output is another interesting challenge.
Reasonable resource models: Enforcing invariants on re-
source usage without making things worse could prove a
challenge: resource limits tight enough to be useful might
be too tight, and limits that avoid problems might be too
loose. Global resource optimization problems have been
studied at length in operating systems, but under a fairly
restricted resource model. Exposing more flexible models
could yield more efficient resource control. For example,
exclusive use of leased resources [9] in a prototype J2EE
application server could enable zero-downtime prophylactic
rebooting of components to combat software aging.
System macrocompiler: Type safety has gone a long way
in validating inputs and outputs of programs. Compilers
have improved low-level predictability and correctness, as
well as given us a way to reason about programs. Unfortu-
nately, high level properties of heterogeneous systems can-
not be verified by compilers. A macrocompiler would val-
idate compatibility between assemblies of black boxes and
the corresponding invariants captured by their fuses, guards,
and resource cops. A macrocompiler might also enable safe
composition of higher level invariants out of properties en-
forced at lower levels, such as type safety. Component prop-
erties, enforced by guards, could then be used to reason
about emergent properties. A macrocompiler using aspect-
oriented approaches [1] can automatically interpose fuses
and guards on arbitrary classes of objects in heterogeneous
environments ranging from C/C++ to Java and J2EE.
Metrics and deployment: Dependability benchmarking is
still an elusive goal, but predictability metrics can bring us
closer to a solution. I’ve suggested experimental variance as
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a measure of predictability, but better, more analytical tech-
niques are needed. Quantifying the tradeoffs involved in en-
gineering predictability could also help with identifying the
parts of a system that would most benefit from improved pre-
dictability; this would enable the incremental retrofitting of
predictability into existing systems in a cost-effective way.
7 Summary
Software fuses and resource cops keep software within
its comfort zone; if bugs continue to manifest, then output
guards and other resource cops bring erratic behavior into
compliance, transforming a black-box program into a fail-
stop module. If programs behave better when external con-
ditions match those envisioned by its designer, then such
predictability begets dependability. Some types of fuses,
guards, and cops are already in ad hoc use today; build-
ing smarter ones and systematically connecting them to pro-
grams can improve predictability of software. The proposed
approach may be a productive alternative to fixing pernicious
bugs or rewriting flakey software, and may ease the integra-
tion of imperfect software into complex systems.
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